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OVERTURNING QUILL: WHY WAYFAIR WAS CORRECTLY 
DECIDED AND WHAT LIES AHEAD 
“In the name of federalism and free markets, Quill does harm to both. The 
physical presence rule it defines has limited States’ ability to seek long-term 
prosperity and has prevented market participants from competing on an 
even playing field.”1 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
There is no easier way to shop than online. A consumer can purchase 
virtually anything with the simple click of a mouse. In the past, it was often-
times cheaper for consumers to shop online not because many websites of-
fered free shipping with a subscription or a minimum purchase, but because 
many websites were not required to charge sales tax. Avoiding the added 
expense of sales tax could save hundreds of dollars for a consumer over the 
course of a year. This protection was furnished by the “physical presence” 
rule established in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of 
Illinois and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota. The physical presence rule barred 
states from requiring out-of-state retailers to collect and remit sales tax if that 
retailer did not maintain a physical presence in the taxing state. But consum-
ers will no longer be awarded the benefits of this bargain. Recently, in South 
Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., the Court overturned the long-standing precedent 
established in Bellas Hess and Quill. States are now permitted to require out-
of-state retailers to collect sales tax even if that retailer does not maintain a 
physical presence in the taxing state. In light of the Court’s recent decision, 
state and local governments will no doubt begin to impose sales tax for online 
retail purchases. This Note will first walk through how we got to where we 
are today. It will then discuss why the Court’s recent decision was correct 
and what the next steps are in addressing potential issues arising in the after-
math of South Dakota v. Wayfair.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2096 (2018). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the birth of the Internet, e-commerce has grown to a size that some 
may have never thought possible and is still on the rise. You will be hard 
pressed to find someone under the age of say, maybe 60, who has not made 
a purchase online. This growth has led to a boom in the economy and in the 
retail industry. But it has led to a bust in state budgets. For over two decades, 
states have been unable to effectively charge sales tax—a majority of states’ 
main source of income—on online purchases made from out-of-state retail-
ers. This is because of the Supreme Court’s 1967 decision of National Bellas 
Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois2 and its 1992 decision of Quill 
Corp. v. North Dakota.3  These cases established the precedent that in order 
                                                     
2. 386 U.S. 753 (1967). 
3. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
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for states to force out-of-state retailers to collect sales tax on retail purchases, 
the out-of-state retailer must have a physical presence in the state where the 
purchase is made. 
In the decades since Quill, states have enacted an array of different laws 
in an attempt to compensate for the sales tax revenue lost to retail purchases 
made online. However, these laws do little to combat the problem and have 
only made up for a miniscule amount of the revenue lost. In 2015, states were 
offered a glimpse of hope when the Court issued its decision in Direct Mar-
keting Association v. Brohl.4 In that decision, Justice Kennedy (who joined 
in the majority opinion in Quill), in his concurring opinion, explicitly stated 
that the time had come for the Court to reexamine Quill and urged a state to 
challenge Quill’s long-standing precedent. In 2016, South Dakota answered 
the call and passed legislation that went against Quill for the sole purpose of 
bringing a challenge to the Court.  
Finally, in its June 2018 decision of South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.,5 the 
Court overturned the physical presence requirement. States are now liberated 
from Quill’s grasp and the playing field is leveled. But overturning Quill was 
only the beginning. State governments and Congress must now focus on 
providing a workable tax framework so that state and local governments, 
businesses, and consumers can thrive in light of the Court’s most recent de-
cision. 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE ON SALES AND 
USE TAXES IMPOSED ON OUT-OF-STATE RETAILERS 
Prior to Wayfair, the Supreme Court had never directly been presented 
with the question of whether a state may impose a sales or use tax on online 
purchases made from an out-of-state retailer. However, the Court had held 
that states may not impose sales or use taxes on mail-order purchases from 
out-of-state retailers unless the retailer had a “substantial nexus” with the tax-
ing state as required by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.6 The Court, 
in Quill, determined that in order to pass the “substantial nexus” test, the re-
tailer must have a physical presence within the state where the purchase is 
made.7 Even though the constitutionality of taxing online sales had never 
been decided by the Court, it was easy to see how its jurisprudence surround-
ing the taxation of mail-order purchases from out-of-state retailers did not 
allow for online sales to be taxed unless the retailer maintained a physical 
                                                     
4. 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015). 
5. 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
6. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 311. 
7. See id. at 317. 
            
524 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:3 
presence within the state where the purchase is made.8 Over time, online pur-
chases skyrocketed.9 Along with this this economic shift came a shift in the 
Court’s attitude towards the taxation of online purchases.10 The soar in online 
purchases and the Court’s shifting attitude finally gave way to allowing states 
to tax online purchases from out-of-state retailers. 
A. ESTABLISHING THE PHYSICAL PRESENCE RULE: NATIONAL BELLAS 
HESS, INC. V. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF ILLINOIS 
In 1967, the Supreme Court decided National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. De-
partment of Revenue of Illinois. Bellas Hess established the physical presence 
test relied on by the Court in Quill.11 Bellas Hess came by way of an appeal 
of a judgment from the Illinois Supreme Court requiring that Bellas Hess 
collect and remit to the state use taxes imposed by Illinois statute.12  
National Bellas Hess was a mail-order house incorporated in Delaware 
with its principal place of business located in North Kansas City, Missouri.13 
Twice a year, Bellas Hess mailed catalogues throughout the nation to its ac-
tive or recent customers.14 It also occasionally mailed advertising flyers to its 
past and potential customers.15 To purchase merchandise, Bellas Hess’ cus-
tomers mailed their orders to Bellas Hess at its Kansas City location.16 Bellas 
Hess then sent the ordered goods to the customers by either mail or common 
carrier.17 Bellas Hess did not maintain any physical places of business in Il-
linois, did not employ any salesmen or representatives in Illinois, did not own 
property in Illinois, did not have a telephone listing in Illinois, and did not 
advertise in Illinois in any other way besides the catalogues and flyers.18  
Under Illinois statute, “retailers maintaining a place of business in [Illi-
nois]”19 were required to collect from the purchaser and pay to the Depart-
                                                     
8. Ricky Hutchens, Note, Desperate Times Call for Desperate Measures: States Lead Mis-
guided Offensive to Enforce Sales Tax Against Online Retailers, 68 VAND. L. REV. 575, 584 (2015). 
9. See discussion infra Part VI.A. 
10. See Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1134 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
11. Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S 753, 758 (1967). 
12. Id. at 754. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 754-55. 
17. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 755. 
18. Id. at 754. 
19. Under Illinois statute at the time, a “retailer maintaining a place of business in [Illinois]” 
included any retailer “[e]ngaging in soliciting orders within the State from users by means of cata-
logues or other advertising, whether such orders are received or accepted within or without this 
State.” Id. at 755. 
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ment of Revenue a tax for tangible personal property purchased by consum-
ers for use in Illinois.20 The retailer was also required to provide a receipt to 
the purchaser if demanded and to “keep such records, receipts, invoices, and 
other pertinent books, documents, memoranda, and papers as the [Depart-
ment] shall require, in such form as the [Department] shall require, and must 
submit to such investigations, hearings, and examinations as are needed by 
the [Department] to administer and enforce the use tax law.”21 Failure to 
comply with these requirements was punishable by a fine of up to $5000 and 
imprisonment of up to six months.22  
Bellas Hess argued that the Illinois statute violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and created an unconstitutional burden 
upon interstate commerce.23 The Court recognized that the tests for analyzing 
a Commerce Clause claim and an economic Due Process Clause claim were 
similar.24 At the time, a state tax was permissible under the Due Process 
Clause when a state had offered something for which it could ask for a re-
turn.25 For a state tax to survive the confines of the Commerce Clause, the 
tax “[could] only be justified as designed to make such commerce bear a fair 
share of the cost of the local government whose protection it enjoys.”26  
Prior to Bellas Hess, the Court had upheld state use taxes in circum-
stances where the out-of-state seller maintained local retail stores and had 
agents soliciting and arranging sales out of state for the seller. However, the 
Court had not upheld state use taxes when the seller sent catalogs through the 
mail to customers or advertised through radio and newspapers.27 The Court 
recognized the distinction between the cases where a state use tax was upheld 
and the cases where a tax was struck down.28 That is, use taxes imposed on 
out-of-state sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a state 
were permissible; use taxes imposed on out-of-state sellers who did no more 
than communicate with customers by mail or common carrier, on the other 
hand, were not permissible.29  
The Court held that use taxes imposed on out-of-state sellers with no 
physical presence in the state or locality violated the Due Process and Com-
                                                     
20. Id.; see also Dep’t of Revenue v. Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc., 214 N.E.2d 755, 757 (Ill. 1966). 
21. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 755. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 756. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 757-58. 
28. Id. at 758. 
29. Id. 
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merce Clauses because “local jurisdictions [had] no legitimate claim to im-
pose a ‘fair share of the cost of the local government’” and because “[t]he 
very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to ensure a national economy free 
from such unjustifiable local entanglements.”30 Central to the Court’s deci-
sion was the fact that if states could impose a use tax on out-of-state sellers, 
then any municipality or political subdivision would also be able to impose 
such a tax.31 Subjecting out-of-state retailers to the many variations in tax 
rates, exemptions, and record-keeping requirements may have created an ad-
ministrative nightmare for businesses, resulting in a burden on interstate 
commerce.32 The Court’s holding essentially established the physical pres-
ence test that was relied on in Quill.33  
The Court concluded by pointing out that “[u]nder the Constitution, this 
is a domain where Congress alone has the power of regulation and control.”34 
Congress’s ability to regulate a state’s imposition of a sales or use tax on an 
out-of-state retailer was also recognized by the Court in Quill.35 Additionally, 
Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent in Wayfair was based upon the premise that it 
was up to Congress, not the Court, to decide whether a state could impose a 
sales or use tax on out-of-state retailers.36 
B. ESTABLISHING PHYSICAL PRESENCE AS A SUBSTANTIAL NEXUS: 
QUILL CORP. V. NORTH DAKOTA 
Nearly three decades later, in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, the Supreme 
Court dealt with the same issue that it did in Bellas Hess—whether sales and 
use taxes imposed on out-of-state retailers accord with the Due Process 
Clause and the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.37 The Quill Court re-
affirmed Bellas Hess, establishing a long-standing precedent that eventually 
led to online retailers having an unfair advantage over traditional brick and 
mortar sellers.38 Until the Court’s decision in Wayfair, Quill had effectively 
barred states from imposing sales or use taxes on online purchases made from 
out-of-state retailers.39 This occurred in an era when e-commerce and online 
                                                     
30. Id. at 760. 
31. Id. at 759. 
32. Id. at 759-60. 
33. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758. 
34. Id. 
35. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992). 
36. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2104-05 (2018) (Roberts, C.J., dis-
senting). 
37. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 305. 
38. Id. at 317. 
39. Id. 
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shopping was growing at an astounding rate and was shaping the way that 
consumers shop today.40  
In Quill, the Court distinguished a state’s taxing ability under the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause from a state’s taxing ability under 
the Commerce Clause of Article I, § 8, clause 3 of the Constitution.41 The 
Court ultimately held that an out-of-state seller may have the “minimum con-
tacts” with a state required by the Due Process Clause, yet lack the “substan-
tial nexus” required by the Commerce Clause.42 Therefore, even though a 
state tax may be permissible under the Due Process Clause, it may not be 
permissible under the Commerce Clause.43 
Quill was a Delaware corporation that sold office equipment and sup-
plies throughout the United States.44 Quill solicited its business through cat-
alogs and flyers, advertisements, national periodicals, and telephone calls.45 
At the time, Quill’s sales in North Dakota were almost $1 million to about 
3000 customers, making it the sixth largest vendor of office supplies in the 
state.46 Under North Dakota statute, Quill was required to collect a use tax 
from purchasers for property purchased for storage, use, or consumption 
within the state and remit it to the state.47 After Quill refused to collect the 
use tax and remit it to the state, the state filed suit against Quill seeking a 
judgment finding that Quill was required to pay the taxes.48 
Quill argued that the state did not have the power to compel it to collect 
a use tax from its North Dakota customers because of Bellas Hess’ holding 
that such a requirement by a state violated the Due Process Clause and the 
Commerce Clause.49 The trial court ruled in Quill’s favor, finding the case 
indistinguishable from Bellas Hess.50 On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court held that Bellas Hess should not have been applied because of changes 
in the economy and the law.51 The state supreme court additionally pointed 
out that advances in computer technology “greatly eased the burden of com-
pliance with a ‘welter of complicated obligations’ imposed by state and local 
taxing authorities,” which was the Hess Court’s central reasoning as to why 
                                                     
40. See discussion infra Part VI.A. 
41. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312. 
42. Id. at 313. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 302. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Quill, 504 U.S. at 302-03. 
48. Id. at 303. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
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state and local use taxes burdened interstate commerce.52 However, the 
United States Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the decision of the 
North Dakota Supreme Court.53 
The Supreme Court first discussed what was required for state statutes 
imposing a tax on out-of-state sellers to be constitutional under the Due Pro-
cess Clause and the Commerce Clause. A state law requiring an out-of-state 
seller to collect and remit use taxes may comply with the Due Process Clause 
if the seller maintains the required “minimum contacts” with the taxing 
state.54 Under a four-part test established in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. 
Brady,55 a state tax would survive a Commerce Clause challenge “so long as 
the ‘tax [1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing 
State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate 
commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.’”56 
The Court notably distinguished the Due Process Clause’s “minimum con-
tacts” requirement from the Commerce Clause’s “substantial nexus” require-
ment, stating, “Although the ‘two claims are closely related,’ the Clauses 
pose distinct limits on the taxing powers of the States. Accordingly, while a 
State may, consistent with the Due Process Clause, have the authority to tax 
a particular taxpayer, imposition of the tax may nonetheless violate the Com-
merce Clause.”57 
The Court arrived at this conclusion because the Due Process Clause and 
the Commerce Clause reflect different constitutional concerns.58 Specifi-
cally, due process concerns the fundamental fairness of governmental activ-
ity, while the Commerce Clause concerns the effects of state regulation on 
the national economy.59 To illustrate, Congress has the power to authorize 
state actions that burden interstate commerce, but it does not have the power 
to authorize violations of the Due Process Clause.60 From the states’ perspec-
tive, even though a state tax may be valid under the Due Process Clause, it 
may not be valid under the Commerce Clause.61  
Next, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of use taxes imposed on 
out-of-state sellers against a Due Process Clause challenge. In doing so, the 
Court relied on the evolution of the law in the area of judicial jurisdiction. 
                                                     
52. Id. 
53. Quill, 504 U.S. at 303. 
54. Id. at 305. 
55. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
56. Quill, 504 U.S. at 311 (citing Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279). 
57. Quill, 504 U.S. at 305 (citation omitted). 
58. Id. at 312. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 305. 
61. Id. at 313. 
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Beginning with the infamous case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,62 
the Court “framed the relevant inquiry as whether a defendant had minimum 
contacts with the jurisdiction ‘such that the maintenance of the suit does not 
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”63 For purposes 
of determining judicial jurisdiction, the Court had, over the years, abandoned 
the rigid physical presence requirement.64 Applying a more flexible frame-
work, a foreign corporation is now subject to jurisdiction where the corpora-
tion “purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an economic market in the 
forum State . . . even if it has no physical presence in the State.”65  
The Quill Court found that the same reasoning justified the collection 
and duty of a tax when a corporation is engaged in the “widespread solicita-
tion of business within a State.”66 That is, if a corporation does business in a 
particular state, it “has ‘fair warning that [its] activity may subject [it] to the 
jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.’”67 Ultimately, relying on the develop-
ments in the law of due process relating to judicial jurisdiction, the Court 
overruled Bellas Hess’ requirement that, under the Due Process Clause, a 
state may only impose sales taxes on retailers maintaining a physical pres-
ence in the taxing state.68 
After determining that state-imposed use taxes on out-of-state retailers 
were permissible under the Due Process Clause, the Court analyzed whether 
such a tax was permissible under the Commerce Clause.69 Because state ac-
tion rather than congressional action was the central issue, the Court, as it did 
in Bellas Hess, founded its analysis in the interpretation of the “negative” or 
“dormant” Commerce Clause.70  
As previously mentioned, the four-part test established in Complete Auto 
governed the validity of state taxes under the Commerce Clause. The North 
Dakota Supreme Court held that the Complete Auto test, which was estab-
lished subsequent to Bellas Hess, rendered Bellas Hess “obsolete.”71 The Su-
preme Court disagreed and determined that Bellas Hess continued to apply 
                                                     
62. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
63. Quill, 504 U.S. at 307 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). 
64. Id. at 307. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 308. 
67. Id. (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in judg-
ment)). 
68. Id. 
69. Quill, 504 U.S. at 309. 
70. Id. The dormant commerce clause prohibits certain state actions that interfere with inter-
state commerce. Id. 
71. Id. 
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when deciding whether Complete Auto’s “substantial nexus” requirement 
was satisfied.72 
Coupling Bellas Hess’ physical presence requirement with Complete 
Auto’s substantial nexus requirement, the Court determined that in order to 
meet the substantial nexus requirement, a retailer must have a physical pres-
ence in the taxing state.73 The Court found value in establishing such a bright-
line rule in the area of sales and use taxes.74 The Court reasoned: 
Such a rule firmly establishes the boundaries of legitimate state au-
thority to impose a duty to collect sales and use taxes and reduces 
litigation concerning those taxes. . . . Moreover, a bright-line rule in 
the area of sales and use taxes also encourages settled expectations 
and, in doing so, fosters investment by businesses and individuals.75 
The Quill majority ended its opinion by pointing out that the issue is one that 
Congress had the ultimate power to resolve.76 The majority recognized the 
possibility that the Court’s decision in Bellas Hess, holding that the Due Pro-
cess Clause prohibited states from imposing use taxes, may have contributed 
to Congress’s inaction.77 Ultimately, the Court pointed out that any due pro-
cess questions had been put to bed by its decision in Quill and urged Congress 
to take action.78 
Quill reinforced the physical presence test established in Bellas Hess to 
determine whether a state tax imposed on an out-of-state retailer is permissi-
ble under the Commerce Clause.79 This standard stood for over twenty-five 
years until, most recently, the Court decided South Dakota v. Wayfair. During 
this quarter century, e-commerce and Internet retail sales grew at an astound-
ing rate, one which was likely unimaginable when Quill was decided.80 In an 
attempt to combat the revenue losses they were experiencing because of un-
taxable Internet sales, states began to enact laws known as “Amazon stat-
utes.” 
 
 
                                                     
72. Id. at 311. 
73. Id. at 314-15. 
74. Quill, 504 U.S. at 317. 
75. Id. at 315-16 (citations omitted). 
76. Id. at 318. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 318. The Court urged Congress to take action by saying, “Congress is now free to 
decide whether, when, and to what extent the States may burden interstate mail-order concerns with 
a duty to collect use taxes.” Id. 
79. Quill, 504 U.S. at 314-18. 
80. See discussion infra Part VI.A. 
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III. AMAZON STATUTES: A MEDIOCRE ATTEMPT BY STATES TO 
DEFEAT QUILL 
The physical presence requirement established in Bellas Hess and reaf-
firmed in Quill seemingly rendered the states powerless in collecting sales 
taxes on purchases made from out-of-state retailers.81 Because of the rise in 
online retailing since Quill, many states attempted to minimize their tax 
losses by enacting laws known as “Amazon statutes.”82 These laws were seen 
as the best-available option for states to recover a portion of the tax revenue 
that they would have otherwise not received.83  
A. THE “CLICK-THROUGH NEXUS” APPROACH 
New York, in 2008, was the first state to enact a statute that attempted 
to collect lost sales-tax revenue from online purchases.84 The New York law 
adopted the “click-through nexus” approach.85 This term is derived from the 
“click throughs” that occur when an individual or business (referred to as an 
affiliate or associate) places a link on its website directing consumers to an 
online retailer’s website.86 This approach sought to collect sales taxes from 
out-of-state retailers on sales made through affiliate or associate retailers lo-
cated in the state.87  
The New York law, specifically, required “vendors” to collect sales and 
use taxes.88 Under the law, a “vendor” is defined as any entity which “solicits 
business” through “employees, independent contractors, agents or other rep-
resentatives.”89 The statute presumed that sellers of taxable property and ser-
vices met the requirement “if the seller enter[ed] into an agreement with a 
resident of this state under which the resident, for a commission or other con-
sideration, directly or indirectly refer[red] potential customers, whether by a 
link on an Internet website or otherwise, to the seller.”90 Given the statutory 
language, in order to meet the requirement, an affiliate had to do more than 
                                                     
81. Hutchens, supra note 8, at 587. 
82. ERIKA K. LUNDER & CAROL A. PETTIT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42629, “AMAZON 
LAWS” AND TAXATION OF INTERNET SALES: CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 1 (2015). 
83. See Hutchens, supra note 8, at 589-90. 
84. Geoffrey E. Weyl, Comment, Quibbling With Quill: Are States Powerless In Enforcing 
Sales and Use Tax-Related Obligations On Out-Of-State Retailers?, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 253, 
265 (2012). 
85. LUNDER & PETTIT, supra note 82, at 5. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8) (McKinney 2013). 
89. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(i)(C)(I) (McKinney 2013). 
90. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi) (McKinney 2013). 
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simply place a link to the retailer’s website on its own website.91 The affiliate 
needed to refer potential consumers to the out-of-state retailer for some type 
of consideration, and gross sales from the affiliate must have amounted to 
more than $10,000 annually.92 Additionally, the statutory presumption could 
be rebutted by the retailer if the retailer offered proof that “the residents’ only 
activity in New York on behalf of the seller was to provide a link to the 
seller’s website and that the residents did not engage in any in-state solicita-
tion directed toward potential New York customers.”93 
Overstock.com and Amazon challenged the New York law on Due Pro-
cess Clause and Commerce Clause grounds.94 In Overstock.com, Inc. v. New 
York State Department of Taxation and Finance,95 the New York Court of 
Appeals affirmed the constitutionality of the law.96 The court held that the 
statutory presumption did not violate the Due Process Clause and that a sub-
stantial nexus existed when an out-of-state company employed affiliate re-
tailers for compensation.97  
Analyzing the Commerce Clause challenge first, the New York court 
cited the Supreme Court’s decision in National Geographic Society v. Cali-
fornia Board of Equalization.98 That case explained the level of physical 
presence required for a state tax law to not violate the Commerce Clause.99 
The Court explained that “although an in-state physical presence is neces-
sary, it ‘need not be substantial. Rather, it must be demonstrably more than a 
“slightest presence.”’”100 Applying this standard, the court stated “[t]he pres-
ence requirement will be satisfied if economic activities are performed in 
New York by the seller’s employees or on its behalf.”101 
                                                     
91. See Hutchens, supra note 8, at 590. 
92. Id. 
93. Overstock.com, Inc. v. New York State Dep’t. of Taxation & Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621, 623 
(N.Y. 2013). The New York court also referenced a memorandum issued by the Department of 
Taxation and Finance, which stated “[t]he presumption would be deemed successfully rebutted if 
the seller satisfies two conditions: (1) if the parties’ contract prohibited the resident representative 
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99. Overstock.com, 987 N.E.2d at 625; see also Orvis Co., Inc. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of 
New York, 654 N.E.2d 954 (N.Y. 1995). 
100. Overstock.com, 987 N.E.2d at 625 (quoting Orvis, 654 N.E.2d at 961). 
101. Id. 
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Based on the above-stated rule of law, the court determined that “the 
statute plainly satisfies the substantial nexus requirement.”102 The court 
found that active solicitation by New York individuals and corporations on 
behalf of out-of-state online retailers met the “demonstrably more than a 
‘slight presence’ standard.”103 Moreover, the court pointed out that the law 
did not impose a tax on retailers – it was merely a means of collecting taxes 
that were “unquestionably due” from the individual purchasers them-
selves.104  
The fact that New York residents were compensated for their solicitation 
played a key role in the court’s decision.105 Had New York residents not re-
ceived compensation, the court would have found that a substantial nexus did 
not exist between the state and the online retailer.106 The court rested its case 
on the conclusion that “if a vendor is paying New York residents to actively 
solicit business in this state, there is no reason why that vendor should not 
shoulder the appropriate tax burden.”107 The court held that the New York 
law did not violate the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.108 
The court then analyzed the Due Process Clause challenge.109 Amazon 
and Overstock argued that the law violated due process “because the statutory 
presumption is irrational and essentially irrebuttable.”110 Plaintiffs chose to 
challenge the law on its face; and the court held that Plaintiffs “failed to 
demonstrate that the statute is facially unconstitutional under . . . the Due 
Process Clause.”111 The court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the law was 
irrational.112 The court found that because affiliates were compensated based 
on the number of referrals they made, it was rational to presume that affiliates 
would “seek to increase their referrals by soliciting customers.”113 The court 
also rejected Petitioners’ argument that the presumption was irrebuttable.114 
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The court determined that the methods provided to rebut the statutory pre-
sumption were adequate even though they potentially placed an inconven-
ience on the online retailer.115 
The challenge to New York’s law survived constitutional muster.116 Fol-
lowing the New York court’s decision, a number of other states enacted sim-
ilar legislation that sought to collect sales taxes from retailers participating in 
affiliate programs.117 As a result, Amazon, who New York’s law was aimed 
towards, largely abandoned its affiliate program in most states.118 Having 
been defeated yet again, states then began to enact laws implementing notice 
and reporting requirements.   
B. THE REQUIRED NOTIFICATION APPROACH 
As an alternative to New York’s Amazon law, a number of states enacted 
legislation taking an alternative approach to collecting sales tax from online 
retailers.119 Led by Colorado, states began enacting statutes that required re-
tailers who did not collect sales tax to report first to the consumer their obli-
gation to pay a use tax and second to the state taxing agency the number of 
purchases made within the state.120 In 2010, Colorado enacted a statute re-
quiring retailers that did not collect Colorado sales tax to: (1) “notify Colo-
rado purchasers that sales or use tax [was] due on certain purchases made 
from the retailer and that the state of Colorado require[d] the purchaser to file 
a sales or use tax return”; (2) provide a year-end notification to each Colorado 
purchaser of the dates of purchases, the amounts of each purchase, and the 
category of the purchase, as well as a reminder that the purchaser was obli-
gated to file a sales or use tax return with the state of Colorado; and (3) file 
an annual statement with the department of revenue for each purchaser show-
ing the total amount paid by the purchaser for the preceding calendar year.121 
If a retailer failed to conform to these reporting requirements, a penalty was 
imposed for each violation.122 
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The constitutional issues raised by Colorado’s reporting law are obvi-
ous.123 First, because the reporting requirements applied to retailers that did 
not have a physical presence in Colorado, it appears as though the statute 
violated the dormant commerce clause because it potentially burdened inter-
state commerce.124 Second, the reporting requirements only applied to out-
of-state retailers.125 The reporting duties were not similarly imposed on Col-
orado businesses.126 Thus, it appears as though the law was discriminatory 
on its face and could only be upheld if it survived strict scrutiny.127 
The constitutional problems with the statute led to the Court’s decision 
in Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl. In 2012, a federal district court 
struck down the Colorado law, finding Quill applied and that the law was 
discriminatory on its face and did not meet strict scrutiny.128 On appeal, the 
Tenth Circuit dismissed the case, finding that the Tax Injunction Act (TIA) 
prohibited federal courts from hearing the case.129 In a unanimous decision, 
the Supreme Court reversed and held that the TIA did not apply.130 More 
importantly, however, was Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, which 
called into question the justification for Quill and invited a challenge to its 
rationale.131  
IV. DIRECT MARKETING ASSOCIATION V. BROHL: A CALL TO 
ACTION 
In 2015, the Court decided Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl. Di-
rect Marketing did not present an opportunity for the Court to directly over-
turn or reanalyze Quill. But Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, in-
vited the opportunity for the Court to hear a case that would allow it to 
reexamine Quill and Bellas Hess.132 When Direct Marketing was decided, 
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Colorado required residents who purchased property from sellers that did not 
collect sales or use taxes to file a return and remit those taxes directly to the 
State Department of Revenue.133 In an attempt to improve compliance with 
this requirement and in an attempt to increase tax revenue from online pur-
chases, Colorado passed a law requiring retailers that did not collect sales or 
use taxes to notify Colorado customers of their tax liability and to report tax-
related information to those customers and the Colorado Department of Rev-
enue.134  
A trade association of retailers claimed that the law violated the United 
States and Colorado Constitutions.135 A federal district court granted partial 
summary judgment and permanently enjoined enforcement of the notice and 
reporting requirements.136 On appeal, the question presented to the Supreme 
Court was whether the Tax Injunction Act (TIA),137 which provides that fed-
eral district courts “shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy 
or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient 
remedy may be had in the courts of such State,” deprived the district court of 
jurisdiction over the suit.138 Direct Marketing did not call into question a state 
statue attempting to collect taxes from purchases made online by requiring 
out-of-state retailers to collect and pay a sales tax. Therefore, the Court did 
not analyze the constitutionality of such a statute. However, Justice Kennedy 
recognized the “injustice faced by Colorado and many other States.”139 
 Justice Kennedy asserted that the Quill majority acknowledged that its 
conclusion was wrong when the case was decided.140 Yet, based on the prin-
ciple of stare decisis,141 it still held that retailers must have a physical pres-
ence in the state in order for tax-collection duties to be imposed upon them 
under the Commerce Clause.142 In fact, Kennedy confronted the fact that he 
himself (along with Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas) based his concurrence 
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in the judgment of Quill on stare decisis alone.143 He stated that upholding 
the rule established in Bellas Hess based on stare decisis “further underscores 
the tenuous nature of that holding.”144 Kennedy opined that the Quill Court’s 
decision was “now inflicting extreme harm and unfairness on the States.”145 
Kennedy contended that the Quill Court should have taken the opportunity 
to reevaluate Bellas Hess in light of Complete Auto and the technological and 
social changes taking place at the time.146  
Kennedy went on to offer an array of statistics illustrating the growth of 
the Internet and Internet sales since Quill and the inability of states to effec-
tively tax such sales.147 At the heart of his concurrence, Kennedy stated: 
Given these changes in technology and consumer sophistication, it 
is unwise to delay any longer a reconsideration of the Court’s hold-
ing in Quill. A case questionable even when decided, Quill now 
harms States to a degree far greater than could have been anticipated 
earlier. It should be left in place only if a powerful showing can be 
made that its rationale is still correct. . . . The legal system should 
find an appropriate case for this Court to reexamine Quill and Bellas 
Hess.148  
Given the invitation offered by Kennedy enticing a state to challenge Quill, 
a number of states enacted statutes requiring out-of-state sellers to collect 
sales taxes for purchases made online or through other means.149 Most nota-
ble of these statutes was South Dakota’s, which directly challenged Quill’s 
physical presence requirement by imposing a sales and use tax on any retailer 
conducting a certain amount of business within the state.150 This statute and 
the reversal of Quill will be analyzed in the following section.  
V. SOUTH DAKOTA V. WAYFAIR, INC.: ANSWERING THE CALL 
After Justice Kennedy issued his concurring opinion in Direct Market-
ing, a number of states enacted statutes that attempted to collect sales and use 
taxes from remote sellers, even if the seller did not have a physical presence 
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in the state.151 In 2017, Alabama, Indiana, North Dakota, Virginia, Tennes-
see, and Wyoming all passed legislation that addressed the sales tax issue.152 
When Wayfair was decided, new sales tax legislation had been passed or was 
pending in thirty-two out of the forty-five states that impose a sales tax. This 
legislation asserted either a nexus based on the sales activity in a state without 
regard to the seller’s physical presence in the state or imposed requirements 
similar to Colorado’s notice and reporting requirements previously dis-
cussed.153 Additionally, forty-one out of the forty-five states that impose a 
sales tax had instituted some form of legislation that expanded physical 
nexus, such as New York did in its Amazon statute, by using affiliate pro-
grams as a way of establishing a physical presence.154  
The most notable legislation was passed by South Dakota. In 2016, 
South Dakota passed Senate Bill 106.155 Senate Bill 106 intentionally obli-
gated sellers with no physical presence in the state to collect and remit sales 
tax if the seller’s gross revenue exceeded $100,000 annually in the state or if 
the seller conducted 200 or more separate transactions annually in the 
state.156 The bill itself expressly stated that the purpose of the legislation was 
to bring about a challenge to the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause juris-
prudence on the sales tax issue.157 
In light of this newly passed legislation, South Dakota commenced a 
civil action against Wayfair, Inc., Overstock.com, Inc., and Newegg, Inc., 
attempting to collect unpaid sales taxes on purchases made online through 
these companies.158 Bound by the Supreme Court’s precedent, the South Da-
kota Supreme Court ruled in favor of Wayfair, Overstock, and Newegg and 
affirmed the lower court’s decision to enjoin South Dakota from enforcing 
the 2016 legislation.159 The court recognized the invitation in Justice Ken-
nedy’s concurrence in Direct Marketing to challenge Quill and the persua-
siveness of South Dakota’s arguments.160 However, the South Dakota court 
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did not take it upon itself to overturn the Supreme Court’s physical presence 
requirement, but instead left the responsibility to the Court to overrule its 
previous decisions.161  
As was the state’s initial intention, the decision of the South Dakota Su-
preme Court was appealed by the state to the United States Supreme Court 
by petition for writ of certiorari.162 On January 12, 2018, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.163 Forty-one other states, two United States territories, and 
the District of Columbia joined South Dakota in its fight to overturn the phys-
ical presence requirement established in Bellas Hess and Quill.164 Addition-
ally, sixty-one amicus curiae briefs were filed with the Court weighing in on 
the issue.165 
On appeal, South Dakota argued that Quill should be overruled because 
local governments were “severely and increasingly harmed by Quill, Quill 
unfairly harms local, brick-and-mortar businesses, and because Quill itself 
harms interstate commerce.”166 South Dakota based its argument on the fact 
that Internet commerce had grown astronomically in the decades since 
Quill.167 Without a way for states to effectively collect sales or use taxes from 
online purchases, states’ revenues continually declined as the popularity of 
online shopping increased.168 This led to budget shortfalls in a number of 
states.169 South Dakota and other states feared that these shortfalls would 
continually worsen if states remained unable to collect sales taxes from 
online purchases.170  
South Dakota also raised the argument that Quill harmed local busi-
nesses because, in order to be price competitive with online sellers that did 
not have to collect sales tax, local business had to discount their prices, which 
erased their profit margin.171 Finally, South Dakota creatively made the ar-
gument that Quill itself burdened interstate commerce.172 This was based on 
the premise that Quill, rather than encouraging businesses to invest in jobs 
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and infrastructure in other states—or, more simply put, to engage in interstate 
commerce—provided an incentive for businesses to locate in one state and 
ship its product to all other states.173 To quote South Dakota’s Petition, 
“Quill’s rule is at war with its own ends; it undermines rather than advances 
the economic union the dormant commerce clause is meant to promote.”174  
Rebutting these presumptions, Respondents (Wayfair, Newegg, and 
Overstock.com) argued that Quill’s physical presence requirement should be 
upheld because the rule was not unworkable and because “changed circum-
stances do not warrant overturning Quill.”175 The crux of Respondents’ argu-
ment was that overturning Quill would be detrimental to small businesses and 
startup companies.176 Businesses would have to comply with the thousands 
of state and local tax jurisdictions throughout the United States.177 Compa-
nies would also be subject to audits throughout the nation.178 Respondents 
rebutted the presumption that advancements in computer software had made 
it easier for businesses to comply with state and local taxing regulations.179 
Costs of implementation, employee training, maintenance, and operation of 
the software were all factors that Respondents argued would burden business 
if they were forced to comply with thousands of tax regulations.180 
Respondents also downplayed the impact that online sales had on state 
and local tax revenues since Quill.181 They contended that the amount of rev-
enue states would receive from taxing online sales was “grossly inflated.”182 
However, conveniently, Respondents never refuted the amount of tax reve-
nue that states contended they were losing by offering their own estimates.183 
Instead, Respondents simply attacked the credibility of the sources South Da-
kota used for its estimates.  
Finally, Respondents offered alternative evidence that downplayed the 
expansion and popularity of online shopping and purported that the number 
of taxable online sales would not dramatically increase if Quill were to be 
overturned.184 This was because many of the nation’s largest retailers, such 
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as Amazon, already collected sales taxes in states that imposed such a tax.185 
However, Wayfair’s arguments and its attack on the studies and statistics pre-
sented by South Dakota held little merit.186  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court sided with South Dakota and the states.187 
On June 21, 2018, the Court issued its opinion in South Dakota v. Wayfair, 
Inc. overruling Quill and Bellas Hess.188 Perhaps appropriately, Justice Ken-
nedy wrote for the majority.189  
After providing a synopsis of the issues presented to the Court and the 
historical context of the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the major-
ity dove head first into its re-examination of Quill and Bellas Hess.190 Wast-
ing no time, Kennedy openly criticized the physical presence rule in the open-
ing paragraph of his Commerce Clause analysis:  
Each year, the physical presence rule becomes further removed 
from economic reality and results in significant revenue losses to 
the States. These critiques underscore that the physical presence 
rule, both as first formulated and as applied today, is an incorrect 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause. . . . Quill is flawed on its 
own terms. First, the physical presence rule is not a necessary inter-
pretation of the requirement that a state tax must be “applied to an 
activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State.” Second, 
Quill creates rather than resolves market distortions. And third, 
Quill imposes the sort of arbitrary, formalistic distinction that the 
Court’s modern Commerce Clause precedents disavow.191 
The majority seemed to draw back somewhat on Quill’s staunch distinction 
between the Due Process Clause’s “minimum contacts” requirement and the 
Commerce Clause’s “substantial nexus” requirement.192 The Court did not 
expressly say that the requirements are one in the same, but it drew them 
closer by stating: “The reasons given in Quill for rejecting the physical pres-
ence rule for due process purposes apply as well to the question whether 
physical presence is a requisite for an out-of-state seller’s liability to remit 
sales taxes. Physical presence is not necessary to create a substantial 
nexus.”193 The Court denied the argument that subjecting small retailers to 
                                                     
185. Chris Isidore, Amazon to Start Collecting State Sales Taxes Everywhere, CNNTECH (Mar. 
29, 2017, 2:59 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/03/29/technology/amazon-sales-tax/index.html. 
186. Reply Brief at 9, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 17-494). 
187. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018). 
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 2087. 
190. Id. at 2087-92 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)). 
191. Id. at 2092. 
192. Id. at 2093. 
193. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2093. 
            
542 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:3 
collecting sales and use taxes in a multitude of jurisdictions burdened com-
merce.194 Reasoning that compliance costs were “largely unrelated to 
whether a company happens to have a physical presence in a State,” the Court 
found that “[t]he physical presence rule is a poor proxy for the compliance 
costs faced by companies that do business in multiple States.”195 To illustrate, 
the Court provided the example that a small business with one salesperson in 
each state was forced to collect taxes in states where its goods were delivered, 
but a large corporation with salespersons in one central location and a website 
accessible in every state was not required to collect sales taxes “on otherwise 
identical nationwide sales.”196 Under such an example, small businesses 
might be burdened equally or more by compliance costs than large remote 
sellers. The Court was not persuaded by the Quill Court’s reasoning and 
Wayfair’s argument that compliance costs would unduly burden interstate 
commerce.197 
The Court also found Quill’s holding contrary to the Commerce Clause’s 
intended purpose.198 The Commerce Clause “was designed to prevent States 
from engaging in economic discrimination so they would not divide into iso-
lated, separable units.”199 However, Quill’s physical presence rule created a 
competitive advantage for remote sellers by sheltering them from state and 
local tax burdens.200 The Court determined that the physical presence rule 
itself burdened rather than promoted interstate commerce because it discrim-
inated against traditional brick and mortar retailers and “produce[d] an incen-
tive to avoid physical presence in multiple States. . . . [T]he desire of busi-
nesses to avoid tax collection mean[s] that the market may currently lack 
storefronts, distribution points, and employment centers that otherwise would 
be efficient or desirable.”201 Stated bluntly, “Rejecting the physical presence 
rule is necessary to ensure that artificial competitive advantages are not cre-
ated by this Court’s precedents.”202  
Moreover, by treating identical actors differently,203 the Court deter-
mined that the formalistic physical presence rule created by Quill was con-
trary to the case-by-case analysis employed by modern Commerce Clause 
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jurisprudence.204 So long as a state law “avoids ‘any effect forbidden by the 
Commerce Clause,’ courts should not rely on anachronistic formalisms to 
invalidate it.”205 The Court advised states to consider “functional, market-
place dynamics” when “enacting and enforcing their tax laws.”206 
The majority also founded its opinion on the “‘dramatic technological 
and social changes’ of our ‘increasingly interconnected economy.’”207 Since 
Quill, “physical presence” has undertaken a different meaning than twenty-
five years ago.208 With widespread access to the Internet, marketing and dis-
tribution techniques have reformed to corroborate with today’s modern econ-
omy. A company may have a physical presence in the state through the cook-
ies it saves to a consumer’s computer by way of the company’s website, 
through the company’s app that a consumer downloads, or by the data storage 
leased by the company in a state.209 “Between targeted advertising and instant 
access to most consumers via any Internet-enabled device, ‘a business may 
be present in a State in a meaningful way without’ that presence ‘being phys-
ical in the traditional sense of the term.’”210 The Court decided that the phys-
ical presence rule was no longer the “bright-line test” that Quill intended it to 
be. Because of a company’s ability to maintain “substantial virtual connec-
tions to [a] [s]tate,” the Court held that the physical presence rule should not 
be maintained.211 
As a matter of policy, the Court saw the physical presence rule as an 
impediment to states’ and localities’ ability to “perform critical public func-
tions” and even implied that it allowed companies to assist in tax evasion.212 
For example, Wayfair provided its customers with home furnishings. In be-
ing able to purchase such items, consumers directly relied on state and local 
governments. To illustrate: 
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a tax on all of its sales to customers from South Dakota, even those sales that have nothing to do 
with the warehouse. But, under Quill, the second, hypothetical seller cannot be subject to the same 
tax for the sales of the same items made through a pervasive Internet presence.” Id. (citations omit-
ted). 
204. Id. at 2095. 
205. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094-95 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 
274, 285 (1977)). 
206. Id. at 2095. 
207. Id. (quoting Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2014) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). 
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. (quoting Direct Mktg., 135 S. Ct. at 1135 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
211. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2095. 
212. Id. at 2096. 
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State taxes fund the police and fire departments that protect the 
homes containing [Wayfair’s] customers’ furniture and ensure 
goods are safely delivered; maintain the public roads and municipal 
services that allow communication with and access to customers; 
support the “sound local banking institutions to support credit trans-
actions [and] courts to ensure collection of the purchase price”; . . . 
and help create the “climate of consumer confidence” that facilitates 
sales.213 
 The Court saw it fit that when remote companies avail themselves of the 
benefits provided by state and local governments, they should not be ex-
empted from compensating these governments for the services that the com-
panies and their customers receive.214 Arbitrarily taxing some, but not all, of 
the companies doing business in the state created marketplace inequality and 
threatened Commerce Clause objectives: 
In the name of federalism and free markets, Quill does harm to both. 
The physical presence rule it defines has limited States’ ability to 
seek long-term prosperity and has prevented market participants 
from competing on an even playing field.215  
 The Court also addressed stare decisis, the doctrine on which Quill was 
largely decided, and which the dissent in Wayfair grounded its argument.216 
The majority concluded that stare decisis “can no longer support the Court’s 
prohibition of a valid exercise of the State’s sovereign power.”217 In the eyes 
of the Court, it was apparent that previous Commerce Clause decisions were 
prohibiting the States from exercising their sovereign power, and that it was 
time for the Court to correct its error.218  
Finally, the majority addressed the dissent’s second argument. That is, 
Congress, not the Court, should be the body to undertake reversal of the phys-
ical presence rule.219 And again, the majority rejected this proposition. It 
found that “[i]t is inconsistent with the Court’s proper role to ask Congress 
to address a false constitutional premise of this Court’s own creation. . . . It 
is currently the Court, and not Congress, that is limiting the lawful preroga-
tives of the States.”220 
                                                     
213. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 328 (1992)). 
214. Id. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2096. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. at 2096-97. 
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After a half-century, the Wayfair Court finally overturned Bellas Hess’ 
and Quill’s ill-founded precedent.221 The next section of this Note will first 
analyze why Wayfair was correctly decided. It will then discuss what is likely 
to come from Wayfair and what Congress must do to correct any deficiencies. 
VI. WHY WAYFAIR WAS CORRECTLY DECIDED AND WHAT LIES 
AHEAD 
A. WHY THE WAYFAIR COURT GOT IT RIGHT 
Statistics show that, prior to Wayfair, states had lost an overwhelming 
amount of revenue because of their inability to tax online purchases.222 Given 
the growth in Internet commerce since Quill, the Supreme Court was right to 
overturn the physical presence rule established in Bellas Hess and Quill and 
allow states to tax purchases made from remote sellers. When Quill was de-
cided, mail-order and Internet sales totaled $180 billion.223 In 2017, e-com-
merce sales totaled over $450 billion.224 The inability of states to tax pur-
chases made as part of this staggering growth has led to massive state budget 
shortfalls.225  
It is estimated that in 2012 alone, states lost a total of approximately 
$23.2 billion in sales tax revenue.226 Estimates of state revenue losses be-
cause of an inability to tax consistently ranged from $8 billion to $33 bil-
lion.227 This is considerably more significant compared to the between $694 
million and $3 billion that states were losing in 1992 when Quill was de-
cided.228 Had Quill not been overturned, the amount of revenue lost by states 
would have continued to increase in the wake of growing e-commerce and 
                                                     
221. Id. at 2099. 
222. Some argue that states are able to tax online purchases through a use tax. However, use 
tax compliance is estimated to be about 1.6% throughout the nation. Chana Joffe-Walt, Most People 
Are Supposed To Pay This Tax. Almost Nobody Actually Pays It., NPR (Apr. 16, 2013, 3:55 AM), 
https://www npr.org/sections/money/2013/04/16/177384487/most-people-are-supposed-to-pay-
this-tax. 
223. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
224. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS, U.S. DEP’T. OF COMMERCE, CB18-125, QUARTERLY 
RETAIL E-COMMERCE SALES: 2ND QUARTER 2018 (Aug. 17, 2018). This does not include mail-
order or phone sales. 
225. Sales taxes make up approximately 25% of total state revenue in the forty-five states that 
assess a sales tax. Olivia LaVecchia, Internet Sales Tax Fairness, INST. FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE 
(July 7, 2016), https://ilsr.org/rule/internet-sales-tax-fairness/. 
226. Collecting E-Commerce Taxes | E-Fairness Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/collecting-ecom-
merce-taxes-an-interactive-map.aspx#2. 
227. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 (2018). 
228. Id. at 2097. 
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Internet sales.229 States were projected to lose more than $211 billion in re-
mote sales revenue from 2018-2022.230 The Court needed to provide some 
relief for states when it had become exponentially more difficult to raise rev-
enue and provide for essential public services. This was a result of the Court’s 
own doing, and it was right to correct its mishap.  
Moreover, as a result of Quill’s physical presence standard, businesses 
were being burdened by states’ attempts to thwart Quill through Amazon 
statutes and similar laws. If Quill’s standard had been reaffirmed by the Way-
fair Court, more states would have undoubtedly established notice and re-
porting requirements such as those implemented in Colorado. These require-
ments had the potential to become more burdensome than collecting and 
remitting sales taxes. Notification had to be sent to each customer multiple 
times throughout the year, companies had to compile reports and submit them 
to the state, and penalties could be imposed if the notice and reporting re-
quirements were not complied with. Again, as the Court recognized, Quill 
itself was proving unworkable as “physical presence” was becoming more 
difficult to define in an era of nonstop technological innovations leading to 
increased efforts by states to recover lost revenues.231 
Due to the massive growth of the Internet, states suffered significant 
budget shortfalls because of Quill’s physical presence rule. Finally, in Way-
fair, the Court recognized its error and overturned Quill’s wrongly decided 
precedent. However, the fight is not over, as states and Congress will have to 
establish workable boundaries in light of Wayfair. 
B. POST-WAYFAIR: NEXT STEPS 
Even though ultimately rejected by the Court, the argument that revers-
ing Quill would subject small retailers to thousands of state and local tax 
jurisdictions was compelling and had merit.232 But the fact that advancements 
in computer software make it easier for businesses to comply with state and 
local tax laws across many jurisdictions offers the impression that the burden 
                                                     
229. Today, e-commerce accounts for approximately 13% of retail sales; by 2022, e-commerce 
is projected to account for approximately 17% of retail sales. Matt Linder, E-commerce Is Expected 
to Grow to 17% of US Retail Sales by 2022, DIG. COMMERCE 360 (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.dig-
italcommerce360.com/2017/08/09/e-commerce-grow-17-us-retail-sales-2022/. 
230. Case for Fairness, 21ST CENTURY RETAIL, http://www.efairness.org/case-for-fair-
ness/index html (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). 
231. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2097-98. 
232. It is estimated that there are between 10,000 and 16,000 total taxing jurisdictions in the 
United States. Respondents’ Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 175, 
at 26. South Dakota contends that the number of tax jurisdictions in the United States are “over-
stated,” and that this estimate takes into account every separate jurisdiction wherever rate variations 
are theoretically possible. See Reply Brief, supra note 186, at 9. 
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on small business is vastly overstated.233 In fact, “in the age of cloud compu-
ting, the marginal cost of adding additional tax jurisdictions beyond 6,000 (or 
even, say, 50) is functionally zero.”234 It must also be noted that many states 
will provide retailers with free software “if it allows them to obtain collection 
compliance.”235 Even though compliance with tax regulations from over 
10,000 tax jurisdictions, in theory, sounds devastating, the fact of the matter 
is that any additional costs are nominal and the burden that would be imposed 
is over-exaggerated.236  
In addition, seventeen of the top eighteen retailers had already begun 
collecting sales taxes prior to Wayfair.237 Amazon collected sales taxes in 
every state that imposed a sales tax.238 Provided with the fact that most re-
tailers had already collected sales tax on online purchases, the Court’s deter-
mination that subjecting retailers to multiple tax jurisdictions would have a 
minimal effect on interstate commerce is sound.  
Granted, compliance with the requirements of several tax jurisdictions 
may be more detrimental to businesses conducting only a small portion of 
business in a taxing state. However, new state laws imposing sales tax on 
remote sellers will likely provide adequate minimums before sales taxes may 
be imposed on the seller. The requirements of South Dakota’s law are that 
any retailer with over $100,000 in revenue or over 200 separate transactions 
annually in the State must collect and remit sales tax on retail purchases.239 
Some may consider this a relatively low bar in the grand scheme of online 
                                                     
233. Reply Brief, supra note 186, at 9. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. 
236. In its original complaint, South Dakota also brought suit against Systemax for failing to 
remit sales taxes to the State pursuant to the 2016 legislation. Preferring not to assert Quill as a 
defense to the lawsuit, Systemax reached a compromise with South Dakota, agreeing to voluntarily 
collect and remit sales taxes in compliance with the law if South Dakota were to dismiss its com-
plaint against Systemax. Systemax began collecting and remitting sales taxes the next day. Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 151, at 7. 
237.  Richard Wolf, Supreme Court Will Decide If Online Retailers Must Collect Sales Tax, 
USA TODAY (Jan. 12, 2018, 6:25 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/poli-
tics/2018/01/12/supreme-court-decide-if-online-retailers-must-collect-sales-tax/1021423001/. 
238. Isidore, supra note 185. After states began to enact alternative nexus laws (such as click-
through nexus laws, affiliated/related party nexus laws, and reporting/notification requirements pre-
viously discussed) Amazon began to reach agreements with states that it would collect and remit 
sales tax, and locate some type of facility in the state, if the state did not enforce collection of sales 
taxes for an agreed upon number of years. See Kendrack D. Lewis, Is e-Fairness Legislation the 
New Cost of Doing Business Online? The Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013 and Its Impact on 
Amazon and E-Commerce, State Governments, and Traditional Retailers, 40 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 
ONLINE 2, 8-14 (2014). 
239. S.B. 106, 2016 Legis. Assemb., 91st Sess. (S.D. 2016). 
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retailing.240 However, these minimums are suitable. For if a remote seller 
conducts $100,000 or 200 separate transactions worth of business annually 
in South Dakota, it likely conducts a significant amount of business in other 
states as well. 
Hopefully, states do not take advantage of Wayfair’s ruling by setting 
minimums significantly below those specified by South Dakota. However, if 
a state were to set minimums that were unduly burdensome towards small 
retailers and interstate commerce, say $10,000 in revenue or twenty transac-
tions annually, the Court could find those statutes to be in violation of other 
Commerce Clause theories if challenged.241 A considerable amount of litiga-
tion could arise from such a situation. This potential litigation may force 
states to narrowly focus their aim on retailers that they know will not be bur-
dened by legislation requiring them to collect sales tax on online purchases. 
More likely is that Congress will finally be forced to do what it has been 
encouraged to do for the past half-century—enact legislation governing sales 
taxes imposed on out-of-state retailers. 
First, states may be forced to simplify their tax codes so that the number 
of taxing jurisdictions within a state is limited. A number of states have al-
ready joined in a voluntary agreement among states known as the Stream-
lined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA).242 The purpose of the SSUTA 
is “to simplify and modernize sales and use tax administration in the member 
states in order to substantially reduce the burden of tax compliance.”243 An 
agreement among states such as the SSUTA makes compliance across mul-
tiple tax jurisdictions cheaper and easier for retailers, reducing the burden of 
compliance with state sales tax laws.244 However, now that states have the 
power to freely impose sales taxes on out-of-state retailers, cooperation 
among states may not continue to the same degree as it did while Quill was 
the law of the land.245 If a discord between states ensues, eventually becom-
ing competitive and ultimately burdening interstate commerce, Congress will 
                                                     
240. The United States Small Business Association considers retailers that do a minimum of 
$7.5 million in average annual receipts a “small business.” However, there are some exceptions to 
these standards for some industries. See 13 C.F.R. § 121.201 (2018). 
241. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2098-99 (2018). 
242. A total of twenty-four states, including North and South Dakota, have enacted laws that 
are in full compliance with the SSUTA. The SSUTA is not binding law among states. States must 
pass laws that are in compliance with the SSUTA in order to be considered a full member state. 
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (as amended May 3, 2018), Art. I §§ 103-04, available 
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1, Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080 (No. 17-494). 
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finally be forced to act. Rather than taking a “wait and see” approach, Con-
gress should be proactive in enacting legislation.   
Since 2001, Congress has introduced several bills addressing the physi-
cal presence rule.246 But because there has never been a legitimate need for 
Congress to address the issue, legislation has never been passed. In 2017, 
three bills were introduced, each of which is currently pending.247  
In the eleventh hour before Wayfair was decided, Senators Ted Cruz, 
Steve Daines, and Mike Lee filed an amicus brief urging the Court to uphold 
Quill so as to allow Congress the opportunity to finally reach a compromise 
and enact legislation altering Bellas Hess’ and Quill’s precedent.248 But in 
the fifty years since Bellas Hess was decided, Congress never felt the need to 
act, despite being encouraged a trio of times by the Court. So why would the 
Court then have been persuaded by a threesome of senators that Congress 
was finally prepared to come up with a solution to the problem? Perhaps now, 
with an actual looming threat of burdened interstate commerce as a result of 
Wayfair, Congress will enact legislation providing states with an opportunity 
to collect sales taxes while still providing protections for small businesses. 
This Note will discuss the three pending bills before Congress and argue the 
effectiveness of each. 
The first of these bills is the Marketplace Fairness Act of 2017 (Act).249 
The Marketplace Fairness Act allows each member state of the SSUTA to 
require remote sellers to collect and remit sales and use taxes for remote 
sales.250 States that are not members of the SSUTA may require remote 
sellers to collect and remit sales and use taxes so long as they adopt and im-
plement “minimum simplification requirements.251 The Act specifies mini-
mum simplification requirements relating to the administration of the tax, 
audits, and streamlined filing.252 The Act also includes a small-seller excep-
tion.253 This exception exempts sellers with less than $1 million annually in 
remote sales from having to collect and remit sales and use taxes on remote 
sales.254  
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The House version of the Marketplace Fairness Act is the Remote Trans-
actions Parity Act of 2017 (Remote Parity Act).255 The Remote Parity Act, 
like the Marketplace Fairness Act, allows states participating in the SSUTA 
to require remote sellers to collect and remit sales and use taxes, as well as 
states not participating in the SSUTA so long as they adopt and implement 
minimum simplification requirements similar to those of the Marketplace 
Fairness Act.256 The Remote Parity Act also carves out a remote-seller ex-
ception.257 However, under the Remote Parity Act this exception is applied 
in phases.258 States could only require the collection of sales and use taxes by 
a remote seller if the seller: (1) has gross annual receipts in excess of $10 
million for the first year following the effective date, $5 million for the sec-
ond year, and $1 million for the third year; or (2) utilizes an electronic mar-
ketplace for the purpose of making products or services available for sale to 
the public.259 
The third bill currently before Congress is the No Regulation Without 
Representation Act.260 This bill essentially codifies the physical presence 
rule.261 It limits a state’s ability to “tax or regulate a person’s activity in in-
terstate commerce only when such a person is physically present in the 
State. . . .”262 The bill defines “physical presence” essentially the same as 
Bellas Hess and Quill did263 and excludes certain activities that indicate a de 
minimis physical presence.264 Even though the Wayfair Court reversed the 
physical presence rule, Congress, of course, still has the authority to re-im-
pose it.265 
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Congress should take a good look at enacting legislation consistent with 
the Marketplace Fairness Act or the Remote Transactions Parity Act. A com-
bination of these bills would create uniformity and deter any burden that may 
result because of Wayfair. Federal legislation would also eliminate any po-
tential for states to discriminate against out-of-state retailers because protec-
tion is provided through the simplification requirements. Imposing simplifi-
cation requirements and carving out exceptions for small sellers is likely the 
best way that Congress can ensure that state-imposed sales taxes on remote 
sellers will not burden interstate commerce.   
The one downfall with the Remote Parity Act is that it exempts a sub-
stantial number of large retailers for a period of two years. Sellers that exceed 
$5 million in gross receipts certainly have the ability to collect and remit 
state-imposed sales and use taxes. Many sellers of this size likely already 
have a physical presence in multiple tax jurisdictions, thus subjecting them 
to multiple sales taxes. Having to account for additional tax jurisdictions 
would not be unduly burdensome for sellers of this size. Another sticking 
point is that there is no small-seller exception if the seller sells his products 
via an electronic marketplace. This would essentially eliminate the small-
seller exception for anyone doing business online. If Congress decides to act, 
it should adopt a small-seller exception no larger than $1 million as put forth 
in the Marketplace Fairness Act, rather than the phased approach provided 
for in the Remote Transactions Parity Act. A minimum of $1 million is large 
enough to alleviate any concerns of burdensome compliance costs for small 
retailers, yet small enough to allow states to collect taxes from large compa-
nies who are not burdened by compliance.   
Rather than resurrecting an unfair, Court-created rule, Congress should 
govern by promoting fairness and providing guidance for states that wish to 
impose sales taxes on out-of-state sellers. But no matter what approach Con-
gress takes, it will likely have to take some type of action in light of Wayfair. 
After all, under the Constitution, “this is a domain where Congress alone has 
the power of regulation and control.”266 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In the half-century since the physical presence test was established in 
Bellas Hess, e-commerce has grown to a size that some may have never 
thought possible. State tax revenues have continually declined over the past 
two decades because of their inability to collect sales tax from purchases 
made online from out-of-state retailers. To combat this problem, states began 
implementing alternative ways to collect sales tax from out-of-state retailers. 
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In 2015, realizing this ever-growing problem, Justice Kennedy invited states 
to pose a challenge to Bellas Hess’ and Quill’s legacy. Capitalizing on this 
invitation, South Dakota, in 2016, passed legislation directly challenging 
Quill’s rationale. And finally, the Court, in South Dakota v. Wayfair, reversed 
Bellas Hess’ and Quill’s physical presence rule. It is now up to Congress to 
decide if it will finally enact legislation that establishes standards for fairness 
for states, retailers, and consumers.  
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